Assessing Boeing Starliner risk: Has NASA's culture changed since Columbia?

Introduction As NASA grapples with whether to bring Boeing Starliner astronauts home on a SpaceX Crew Dragon, I think it's worth talking about how NASA even makes a decision like this. How do they evaluate the risk when everything humans do in space is risky? How do they take their past failures, like Challenger and Columbia, into account when weighing risks? And is commercial crew, with its contractors, somehow worse or riskier than the space shuttle? Let's dive into all of this. One thing that I think is really getting lost in the buzz of discussion around Boeing Starliner and whether Suni and Butch will come home on Starliner or a SpaceX Crew Dragon is a frank discussion of risk. I have seen a lot of people who simply don't understand just how risky space is and how taking huge risks is part of the job of an astronaut. Not undue risk for sure, not risk that is unnecessary, but just generally all spaceflight is risky. There's no such thing as a safe spaceflight because space is inherently unsafe. It is actively trying to kill you. Astronauts know this. It's what they sign up for and astronauts trust that the people on the ground making these decisions have their best interests at the center of the discussion. They trust the people they work with. It's important to remember the space shuttle was not safe. Apollo was not safe. Gemini and Mercury, not safe. But NASA gathers all the data they can on each of their spacecraft in order to mitigate risk and lower that risk as much as possible. That thoroughness is why there have only been three losses of crew. Apollo 1, Challenger, and Columbia. If that's the case then, how does NASA decide whether Starliner is safe to bring home Butch and Suni? Everyone knows that a test flight is inherently riskier than an operational The safety of Commercial Crew flight. And a lot of people have pointed out that the fact that this is commercial space under a commercial crew contract makes it significantly more risky or worse than what NASA has previously done. I would remind you of two things. Contractors built all of NASA's spacecraft. Working with a private contractor is not new. Second, NASA mandated one out of 270 odds for loss of crew for these commercial crew vehicles. Boeing had one over 295. As a comparison, SpaceX's loss of crew statistic for their crew demonstration mission was one over 276. An analysis of the first few operational space shuttle flights had the loss of crew statistic as one in nine. Space travel is inherently risky. As we're talking about risk here, I want to also mention security because ensuring things are secure decreases risk. That's why I want to talk about the sponsor of today's video, Aura. You may have heard that hackers may have basically stolen every social security number from people in the US. 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There are a ton of other cool features to check out as well. To try Aura, go to aura.com/adastra or click on the link in the description. You can try everything they have to offer for free for 14 days and you can feel a lot more secure about your personal information. Okay, so how then if space is inherently risky, does NASA make a decision like this? The way NASA has tackled this over the past two months is Gathering information for a decision basically trying to gather as much data as possible. Boeing has been doing extensive testing on the ground and on orbit to try to figure out the root cause of these thruster failures. And NASA has been talking to experts from all around the country within NASA, outside of NASA, anyone they can. The problem is the thrusters on Boeing Starliner. There are two separate issues within the propulsion system, which is housed within the capsule service module. One is helium leaks. Now helium isn't a propellant, but it's used for pressurization to push fuel to the thrusters. The second is thruster failures due to overheating. It's likely that if Butch and Suni were to undock in Starliner and make their way home, they'd be fine. What NASA is looking at is an edge case scenario in which there's a massive helium leak, which means they would lose the OMAAC or more powerful thrusters used for the orbit burn. And at the same time, the RCS thrusters overheat and they lose those as well. These are less powerful thrusters used for precision and attitude control. If this worst case scenario were to happen, Butch and Suni could be stranded in orbit. And I don't think it would be a stable orbit and they'd end up returning possibly in an unsafe way. And well, you can extrapolate from there. The problem NASA is having is just getting enough data to where they feel confident that that isn't going to happen. They are struggling to quantify risk because they just don't have enough information. And frankly, I'm not sure they can get that data without direct examination of Starliner service module, which is jettisoned before reentry and does not come back to Earth. I do think Boeing probably has enough data now to prevent this issue in future versions of Starliner, but there's still this one to worry Assuming the worst about. I've seen a lot of people claiming it's easy to make that decision. If there's any doubt, just send a SpaceX Crew Dragon up. Problem solved. But that's risky too, because all spaceflight is risky. It's about weighing the risks against one another. Crew Dragon is a known quantity. It has had a lot of operational flights, both with NASA and private missions like those with Axiom. We are relatively confident that it is as safe as it can be, but it wasn't always that way. It's also easy to assume that Boeing is inherently unsafe because of the incredibly bad management practices that we now know have been in place. It's simple to assume that any problems the spacecraft is having are due to those kinds of mismanagement and that the vehicle is unsafe, similar to its aircraft. And that might be accurate, but it also might not be. As someone who has covered space for a long time, I am honestly struggling to tell whether this is actually an issue of mismanagement, whether it's not enough testing, whether it's lack of experience and care, or whether this is indeed, as NASA and Boeing are both saying, a problem that really only could have been found on orbit. But the history of Boeing Starliner also doesn't offer much comfort. I have an in-depth video on it you can check out, but one example? This crewed flight test was delayed because NASA discovered that Boeing had used flammable tape to wrap wiring in the cabin, and Boeing had to remove a mile, a mile of it before the flight could take place. But it's also normal to find problems on a crewed flight test. Just as a reminder, SpaceX changed the Crew Dragon heat shield between their crewed demonstration flight and their first operational flight, Crew-1, because they discovered more wear and tear in spots than was expected. All of this, including the possible mission extension for Butch and Suni, check out my video on that if you want to know more. That actually happens a lot in spaceflight. But all of this is getting more attention than usual because it's Boeing, and because of what else is happening with the company right now. Boeing's aviation business and their space business are two separate divisions, but any issue of company culture is going to permeate throughout, and we did get a report from the NASA Office of the Inspector General about Boeing's mismanagement of construction of the SLS Block 1B. I will have a video on that specific report soon. But it's also important to note that the hardware that Boeing builds for NASA goes through a much more rigorous testing and acceptance process than their aircraft because NASA is putting their own astronauts in the spacecraft and on top of these Commercial Crew providers rockets. Let's also take into account that NASA has emphasized over and over again that they see having two providers for commercial crew as incredibly important. After their experience with the space shuttle, they determined that redundancy was crucial. If Butch and Suni don't return on Starliner, it is unclear whether NASA can certify Starliner for operational flight. If that's the case and NASA asks Boeing to do another crew test flight, I would guess that's the end of Boeing Starliner. Boeing has lost about 1.5 billion dollars on this contract. They may just cut their losses and NASA does not want that happening. But then there's the risk of keeping Butch and Suni on the ISS for longer for this SpaceX Crew-9 mission extension. There's additional radiation exposure with a long duration space flight. There's also two to three weeks between when Starliner went on dock and Crew-9 would arrive. That, if there was an emergency aboard the ISS requiring an evacuation, Butch and Suni would have to come home in Crew-8 as two additional unsuited crew members. For more on this, check out my story about why spacesuits between Boeing Starliner and SpaceX Crew Dragon aren't compatible. There is risk in everything they do in this situation and quantifying that is what NASA is struggling with. Okay, so let's talk about NASA's Columbia and "normalization of deviance" safety culture now because that is obviously relevant here, especially because it has failed in the past, notably with Challenger and Columbia. NASA's organizational culture has been victim to what Diane Vaughn, in her excellent book, The Challenger Launch Decision, coined as normalization of deviance. It's not that NASA has goat fever, though at times that has been a problem, but they also have a history of delaying launches due to problems, grounding the entire shuttle fleet when an issue was detected. They've maintained that safety is paramount and there is evidence of that for sure. But normalization of deviance means that basically if something is operating outside of what is normal, NASA did not demand answers for why it was operating that way. If there was no serious repercussions, NASA just accepted, for example, that some of the foam could indeed break off the external tank and hit the orbiter, but nothing happened as a result, so it was fine and it was acceptable. They didn't demand answers for why the foam was acting that way because it's not supposed to break off or whether that foam could do significant damage to the orbiter's sensitive heat tiles. They normalized the deviance and moved on. This was an issue during Challenger as well and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board made it clear that NASA culture hadn't changed significantly. A normalization of deviance was also at the root of the Columbia tragedy. Engineers who had tried to speak up weren't listened to. So the question I have is, is NASA's safety culture operating the way it should or are we seeing more normalization of deviance? Has safety culture improved? If NASA decides to send Starliner astronauts back on Starliner, are they just assuming it will be okay or do they have the data to back that up? It's certainly hard to make that determination from the outside without looking at the data and test results they have, but here's what I have observed. First, the tone of the press conferences has really been non-hostile is the best term I can think of. There have been complaints about the frequency of the press conferences, even if there's nothing to report or no developments, we still want to be able to ask questions and get information about this flight. That's been getting better for sure. NASA has been listening to feedback there, but also I have attended quite a few NASA press conferences. They can often feel very defensive and unpleasant where it feels like management finds press questions annoying and intrusive. These Starliner press conferences don't have that feel. It does seem like we're getting honest thoughts and information and the team is just doing their best to work through the information they have and find out more. Second, NASA's governance structure has changed. Back during Columbia, the mission management team had pretty much all the power to make the decision of whether it was safe to fly and there was really no one who had the authority to step in and say, "Hey, I have an issue here. I do not think this is safe." But now if there's a safety issue, anyone who has a concern about something, regardless of level, can come forward and that gets flagged. NASA has formally implemented procedures for each of these flags to be analyzed and considered. As the organization moves through the flight readiness review process, which is basically coming to a consensus at each level and each center, they're paying attention to the dissenting voices. On top of that, a reporter, Marsha Smith from Space Policy Online, directly asked at the last press conference about how this kind of decision-making process has changed since Challenger and Columbia. Russ Deloach, chief of NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, made it clear that he is thinking specifically a lot about the organizational silence that permeated NASA during both tragedies. Basically, people wanted to speak up but either didn't feel comfortable or were silenced when they tried. The fact that the organizational issues that led to these tragedies is being considered here at the highest levels, that also gives me some assurance. Russ Deloach also pointed out that taking so many thoughts and opinions and considerations into account here means that they are going to move incredibly slowly while making this decision. And I think that's a good sign that they are giving this the consideration it deserves and keeping in mind past failures while they do it. And that's my final point. The amount of time NASA has taken to make this decision has gone so slowly, but it is also clear they have put so much work into these contingency scenarios. It's clear that they don't think there's a high chance of these thruster failures happening. This is just an edge case. But there are people within the organization at whatever level who are not convinced about starliner safety. NASA is listening to that and taking it seriously. We'll likely find out late this week or sometime next week how and when Butch and Suni will be returning home as NASA is nearing the point where they have to make that final decision. We will see what happens. But for now, thank you for watching. I am Swapna Krishna and this is Ad Astra.