U.S.M.A. at West Point: Dean's Fireside Chat with LTG(R) H.R. McMaster

thank you all for being here uh and uh as noted this is the uh the last fireside chat of the Academic Year who here is a firsty raise your hand I mean I didn't say cheer I just wanted to see hands like how how many days till you graduate is that too many I like that answer too many all right so uh again welcome these Fireside Chats are uh help us explore uh the annual intellectual theme which is this year's innovation technology and the future in National Defense the guest today needs no introduction uh it's my good friend an old boss uh General McMaster uh he's a he has clearly a reputation for being a Innovative thinker and an expert in National Security issues I'm going to read you just a bit on this bio and then we'll get going I promise but it's important so generald McMaster graduate anyone know where he graduated from that's right the United States Military Academy come on give me a round of applause thank you it's not even hard wasn't even a hard one uh he he went on to serve as a commissioned officer in the United States Army for 34 years he retired as a lieutenant general in June uh 2018 after serving as the National Security adviser from 2014 to 2017 he designed the future Army as the Director of army capabilities integration Center and the deputy Commanding General futures of the United States Army training and Doctrine command as a Commanding General at the maneuver Center of Excellence at forbidding he oversaw all training and education for the Army's infantry armor and Calvary Force he's commanded organizations of both peace time and War including a combined joint inter agency task force in Afghanistan from 2010 to 2012 as well as the third armored Calvary regimen in Iraq from 2005 to 6 and Eagle troop second ACR and Operation Desert Storm from 199 to 1991 among his many awards includes a silver star which he received for actions in the first gold War as he commanded a tank uh company during uh the Battle of 73 eastings General mm has a PHD in history uh from the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill he has authored a number of best-selling books one titled Battlegrounds the fight to defend the Free World and D elction of Duty Lyndon Johnson Robert mcnamer The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the lies that led to Vietnam he has lots of essays articles and book reviews on leadership history and the future of war and they've appeared in pretty much every uh publication you can imagine um distinguished fellow at Arizona State University a senior fellow at the Hoover Institute at Stanford and a lecturer at Stanford University Graduate School of Business and I would tell you that uh you could look at it from either perspective I had the great fortune and maybe he had the great Misfortune I got to work for him as a lieutenant as did my brother uh so that was that was a incredible opportunity for both of us from the Reeves family but perhaps most importantly and most impressively he was an assistant professor in the great Department of history at the United States Military Academy so the way I wanted to start this is he thinks we're going to start with some questions but actually I do have a question what we were able to find it's pretty good is the actual letter he sent to come here and teach okay now I know it's pretty good so he actually wrote this letter to the Department of history in March 1991 shortly after ending uh of combat the end of combat operations at in Operation Desert Storm while he was in command of Eagle troop there's so many good lines in this thing I'm going to post this online immediately after this so everybody can read this okay so just a couple of things uh I would like to to write notice about this letter the handwriting is beautiful anyone here a Psychology major what does that mean about him I don't know this is beautiful handwriting but here's something a couple of highlights for you so he he talks early on and let me quote him I he said I found that much of my reading of military history applied to this particular campaign talking about his his time in combat in Operation Desert Storm he said General Harmon's notes on the Tunisian campaign and r papers applied most directly if that's not like the best advertisement ever for the teaching of history and reading of History uh for officers I don't know what what is I also love this line because I am an old armor officer he says I really loved how our officers ncos and soldiers fought as a team and behaved like veterans in their first major battle remember this is he's writing to the department head to come here and teach he said we assaulted the enemy position with tanks leading we assaulted the enemy position with tanks leading twice the scouts initially provided a base of Fire fire that moved behind the the tanks to protect the flanks and rear this is my favorite part the enemy felt the full shock effects and Firepower of armor I mean like boom drop it like who didn't go armor bad idea right that's awesome so um I mean that really doesn't get any better if you're an armor officer than that but I just wanted to start with some questions you're not here to you're not here to listen to me you're going to hear from General McMaster and I will tell you of all the great leaders I've known in my life I have uh I you don't find many that are this honest this Direct and this pointed and I appreciate that we're going to have a very honest and direct conversation tonight about things that you're going to need to know uh very very soon but also some things um that maybe you don't know and so let me just start with the first question sir uh you wrote an article in 2021 that was published in the National Review titled preserving the warrior ethos where you make the observation that the warrior ethos is at risk so can you just explain what you mean by Warrior ethos okay great and thanks Joe re what blast it is to be with this my old Lieutenant Reeves here who was fantastic as an officer at that level and just fun as hell to be around and his brother was extremely courageous in combat as well and and and the next Reeves is about to be conditioned commissioned here uh and carry on that tradition but hey what a privilege it is to be with all of you I just want to say before you even start thank you for volunteering to serve our nation at a critical moment we'll talk maybe a bit about this but I do think that we are in a period of of really sign significant danger in that our adversaries around the world are coming together they're cooperating more and they're challenging us uh in in in ways that I think are going to lead maybe to a cascading of Crisis that we already see ongoing cascading further so our nation is certainly going to need you to lead our soldiers in combat and and it's really humbling to be with all of you thank you for the privilege and so important for to us to be able to fight and win in Wars I think more than any other kind of feature of of uh of our of our profession is our Warrior ethos and I would describe our Warrior ethos as a covenant a covenant that binds us to one another in our profession and a covenant between us and the society our country and the citizens in whose name we fight and serve and the ethos is what we expect of of one another based on the principles the values that we know are essential to combat Effectiveness that's certainly your sense of Honor right because as as uh as as John uh Keegan said in in the in in the face of battle that battle is about the struggle of men and women trying to reconcile their Instinct for self-preservation with the achievement of some aim over which others are trying to kill them so your sense of Honor what that means is hey I I am more worried more fearful of letting you down on either side of me than I am of the eny enemy or what might happen to me your sense of honor your courage your commitment to the mission and to the man or woman next to you and then and then also uh certainly uh your your your willingness to sacrifice for one another being part of a team in which the man or woman next to you is willing to give everything including their own lives for you and in good units who are bound together by that ethos they take on the quality of a family you know and and you're bound together by common purpose Mutual trust and and really affection that's that's our our Warrior ethos and and and I think I think it's at risk as I mentioned in this essay sir why do you think it's at risk it's at risk I think in part because popular culture cheapens and coarsens the warrior ethos if you if you look at popular culture I'm talking you know about video games and movies and so forth they really don't do anything to help you understand the Warriors calling what brings you to that profession what brings you to want to to be part of an organization that is commitment to committed to those to those principles also you know I think that there's a tendency in popular culture to portray Veterans for example as as traumatized fragile human beings those who don't understand our military understand our commitment to Excellence and to one another you know they they tend to sort of feel sorry for the military and not recognize the tremendous rewards of service I mean as you know I mean soldiers we don't want to be pied who wants to be pied right and and so I think that this misunderstanding puts a strain on that Covenant uh between what Society expects of us and what we expect from our society uh but it also I think uh can put some strain on on you you know or those who are thinking about serving because they don't really understand the rewards of service right and and that rewards those rewards are less ible harder to understand right it's easy to understand you know long times away from from your family and and having to to make sacrifices or the worst you know to see somebody who you care about who you love killed in combat but what but the rewards have everything to do with what you achieve in protecting our nation and I believe that our Warriors you all of you are warriors and humanitarians both because it's you that stands between really our fellow citizens uh and and those who would do us harm and we've seen this time and time again from uh from 9/11 certainly in in our most recent careers um but you saw that for the ukrainians right uh and and how they have to rely on their Warriors or how with the Israelis after the heinous attacks of October 7th so anyway I I'm concerned about it there are other reasons I'm concerned about it maybe we can talk about as as well sure sir and and one thing that you note in the article is that some may say well technology means that the warrior ethos is perhaps we don't it's not as necessary or that potentially a state an advanced State like the United States could opt out of conflict why do you think that's an those are incorrect assumptions yeah well I mean you like to paraphrase you know trosy you know I mean you know you uh you may not be interested in war but War's interested in you right and and as a philosopher GK Chesterton said war is not the best way of settling differences but it's the only way to ensure they're not settled for you right and and this is what some people who don't who don't understand a profession like you do who aren't Warriors like you are they think wait why does why the ukrainians just you know kind of deal with the Russians just give up but from the Ukrainian perspective the cost of of a of of of a ceasefire is much higher than continuing the fighting because their survival is at stake and so it's it's important to understand that you know uh uh Wars choose you often times than than the other way around the second thing is in terms of Technology what what as I look at at at at history uh and military history and I usually you know I do that in the way that Sir Michael Howard the great historian recommended we study history in width depth and context right you study history in width so you can understand hey changes that happen right over time different Technologies different forms of warfare uh Warfare evolves the character of uh uh of warfare um and but the nature of War remains consistent so studying war in with allows you to see continuities and changes right the the historian Carl Becker said memory of past and anticipation of future should walk hand inand in a happy way without one disputing Primacy over the other and what you will find when you're sensitive to continuity and change is that new forms of warfare typically don't replace the old one they're usually grafted onto the old ones and and there you know really there are two fundamental ways to fight asymmetrically and stupidly this is what our historian colleague Conrad crane pointed out years ago you hope the enemy picks stupidly like desert storms Saddam Hussein was like we called them out onto the schoolyard uh and and beat them up with with our asymmetrical advantages others have have learned from that and so whatever you think your major differential Advantage is Right surveillance capabilities Big Data analytical tools and other forms of artificial intelligence longrange Precision strike there are traditional countermeasures to that dispersion concealment intervening with civilian pop potion deceptions right now we have the ubiquity of drones hey well you know counter drone Warfare is going to catch up right in Warfare you have the machine guns deciphers well then you have the tank but then you have the anti-tank missile you have the submarine the sonar remember the bomber is always going to get through oh radar right so so it's this continuous interaction uh that that limits the impact of any kind of range of Technologies and ultimately it's those continuities in the nature of war that I think you have result in in the fact that Wars still resemble each other more than they resemble any other human activity this is another observation of of of Michael Howard and so what are what are continuities in the nature of War okay this is a quiz for the first days really quick okay Wars an extension of politics like okay well you know everybody knows that that's like the Geico commercial man everybody knows that clausman said that but what that means is that that to you have to get to a sustainable political outcome that brought you into the war to begin with so the consolidation of military gains that's never been like optional in war the second is that war is human people fight for the same reasons through cities identified 2500 years ago fear honor and interest and unless what you're doing militarily addresses those drivers of conflict you're not going to be successful in achieving the outcome you want in war third war is uncertain and this is really important because if you buy into the narrative that you hear today or we heard the same stuff in the 90s when Steve and I and those teaching here you know hey really really the next war will be fundamentally different from all those that have gone before it because now we have like satellite capabilities Precision strike capabilities assured Communications big data analytics that makes what they call it at the time the revolution in military Affairs future War would be fast cheap efficient wage that standof range our forces could be lean and Nimble you know so so there were all these assumptions were made in the '90s and it was a setup for many of the difficulties we encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan I believe wars during which we we took a short-term approach to long-term problems and actually lengthened those Wars made them more costly and finally Wars a contest of Wills that's true at the national level and I think we in large measure defeated ourselves with the end the endless Wars Mantra but war is a contest of wills at the Tactical level back to that disintegration of human groups and it's our ethos and our commitment to one another that cohesion that we have in units that allows us to to create a Bull workk against fear a Bull workk against that disintegration because we want to disintegrate the other human group right with our confidence in one another and our and and our military prowess our ability to fight together as a team there one if there is a a new Dynamic that has probably you know started to fill some important spaces when it comes to Warfare It's information and social media and and so the Israelis for example there's an argument to be made that they could they could actually win the ground in Gaza but lose the C the information campaign how do you see information affecting so much of this yeah well I I think this is a really important question a really important point to win right to win you want to defeat your enemy defeating your enemy again going back to cloudwood right winning according to Claus say convincing your enemy that your enemy has been defeated right that convince your enemy they can no longer longer pursue their objectives through the use of force that means physical defeat of the enemy but it's also psychological defeat and winning on the battleground of perception and I think we all have to think about how do we do that when we conducted obviously I'm not making an analogy between counter Insurgency in Iraq and Gaza there are so many fun different factors involved but we said okay for us to win here for us to be able to defeat Al-Qaeda and Iraq and establish a new political and security order that leads to sustainable security that and and stability uh that is you know fundamentally hostile to these jihadist terrorists we have to win on the battleground of perception by doing three really critical tasks we have to clarify our intentions we have to counter enemy disinformation and propaganda and we have to trace the Grievances of the population back to those who created those grievances in this situation in in uh in tilfer which is kind of maybe analogous to Gaza al-Qaeda in Iraq was committing mass murder for example murdering people and then blaming people other themselves for their own motor sack well it's that Iraqi government Security Forces you know but they're the ones doing murdering people uh also uh what was what was critical in this in this connection was to to clarify all the agreement hey we don't have basic Services well you know whose fault is that Al-Qaeda and Iraq is killing the drivers of of the uh of the of the trucks that are supposed to bring clean water hey our government in Baghdad they don't represent us well did you vote no why well if we went to the polls we'd be killed okay whose fault is that right so it's important I think to to peel this back in the case of Gaza you know Hamas is an organization that took over by force in 2005 in Gaza it immediately began diverting any kind of assistance that was meant for the Palestinian people into its terrorist capabilities and its terrorist infrastructure diverted tens of billions of dollars away away from the population into that terrorist capability this is an organization that unlike us right what's our job to protect the American people to protect our citizens What is hamas's strategy in part their strategy is to get as many Palestinians killed as they can right I mean what did they think was going to happen after October 7th and Hamas is an organization that is not only victimizing their own people but they're perpetuating their suffering I wish that the Israelis or maybe maybe they didn't it didn't get aired had done like an equivalent of the lifestyles and the Rich and Famous of Hamas leaders you know living in their five-star hotels in in u but how about their Mansions their Villas on the Mediterranean coast and then quick cut to deprivation uh in in in in Gaza so you know I do think that there could have been much more done on the Battleground perception and as well to um to protect uh innocence in the context of the operation that had to be conducted in very dense Urban Terrain against an organization that's using the population as human Shields so this is too good I'm going to come back to the war ethos but I have to stay on this thread for a second do you believe that the Hamas attack on on October 7th was orchestrated by the Iranians with a particular goal of trying to to stop the normalization of relations between the Israelis and the Arab states in particular Saudi Arabia okay so yes this was this was orchestrated planned prepared uh by the Iranians uh and it was in part due to trying to to break the possibility of the normalization of relations with the Saudis and others but I don't think that was the principal goal I think the principal goal was to destroy Israel and kill all the Jews I mean I think when we when we listen to when we when these authoritarian uh dictators terrorist leaders you know like IAT toah hame this the head of the Theocratic dictatorship in Iran when he says what he wants to do I think we should take him at his work you know and and uh and I think what you've seen over the years since the early 1980s at the at the at you know probably even going back to uh 7980 is that Iran has established and has been pursuing what it calls a forward defense strategy but it's really a forward offense certainly after after the Iran Iraq war they said okay we don't want to disaster Ro like on our borders again so let's come up with a strategy that allows us to expend every Arab and Palestinian life right they don't give a damn in pursuit of their objectives and one of their critical objectives is to destroy Israel and kill all the Jews now the way that they want to do that is they want to keep the Arab world perpetually weak and in meshed in Conflict to do that by creating militias that lay outside of a government's control that can be turned against that government if that government acts against Iranian interests right this is the Hezbollah model this is what they have you know in in Iraq with the hostas shabi milias this is what they have in Yemen with the houthis and their their support of Assad is similar in that they perpetuate the cycle of sectarian violence to keep the Arab world perpetually weak and they can extend their hegemonic influence throughout the region they can also use those proxies for step a which is push us out of the region as the first step in isolating and destroying Israel around Israel in particular they have established the ring of fire strategy or capability with a number of proxies including Hezbollah which has the about 150,000 Rockets uh aimed at Israel some of them retrofitted with Precision kits you have a proxy Army that Iran is forming on Israel's Border in Syria many of them are being recruited from Afghanistan or from or from Iraq you have the the uh you have obviously Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad you know some of them are in Lebanon too Hamas has been active in Lebanon recently but in Gaza and and in in the West Bank primarily for those two groups so I I think I think Iran has activated this this uh this ring of fire the only reason Iran is holding back on Hezbollah is that it's that's its main deterrent to try to prevent Israel from striking Iran's nuclear and missile facilities directly with conventional Force so that's why they're holding back but what happens next I'll say quickly Israel must go into Rafa there's there's no option other than that I mean I can't believe we're advising them not to go into Rafa I mean your your mission is to destroy the enemy but you're just going to leave their leadership there you're just going to allow them to reconstitute later you can't do it now can you can you do that in a way that minimizes uh risk to civilians yes they should they should force Hamas to release as many civilians as they can into areas that are already cleared by Gaza and it would be nice if the Egyptians opened up some way of vress temporarily so they can get out of Harm's Way that would be nice so put pressure on that provide as much humanitarian assistance RAF is going to happen I think in in the next couple of weeks you see it it's already initiated then I think if you're Israel what do you do what's the lesson of of of of Gaza don't allow a hostile terrorist organization is determined to destroy you to be on your borders with significant capabilities I think by the end of the summer there's going to be an offensive into into Southern Lebanon uh and and maybe to the depth of maybe 20 kilm and a destruction of homas infrastructure in southern Lebanon and maybe an extended occupation of Southern Lebanon what happens next what happens next I think is is the act the r the ring of fire might get activated completely with other proxies as we've seen you know with the missile launch maybe there's direct attacks from Iran but I think it's only a matter of time uh that Iran before uh before Israel strikes Iran's uh nuclear facilities and missile facilities so I have another follow on question job security for you yeah good [Applause] job sir I'm I'm coming back to uh I'm getting back to the warrior ethos but I have to follow up with this question you say that when we we get we we have a an autocrat say something we should listen to him so chairman G has said I'm going to Taiwan on my watch he's 70 years old is he going yes he's going and and what what he would prefer to do Xian ping would prefer to achieve annexation of Taiwan through invitation and so I think what we are likely to see in in the coming months maybe a couple years is is increasing coercion and subversion uh against Taiwan in in some of the tried forms that theyve used disinformation propaganda various forms of political subversion uh but also coercion with maybe soft blockades with economic coion with buying off of elites with bribes and so forth so I don't think that's going to work with Taiwan I mean Taiwan has learned vicariously through the fate of Hong Kong when human Freedom was extinguished there and so what does what does xiin ping do next he's preparing for war and I think we have to we have to see not only what he said on certain occasions but the pattern of his speeches that he gives that often times are only Declassified you know a year later or something in in one of these speeches that Matt pottinger highlighted and I recommend reading anything he writes including the recent co-authored essay in foreign affairs uh as well as another great essay by Liz economy on xiin Ping's intentions with his five big initiatives you know including the Global Security initiative which if that isn't concerning how about the global civilization initiative you know who wants to sign up for that program so essentially what what Shian ping is doing is becoming more and more aggressive and trying to establish really an exclusionary area of Primacy across the indopacific uh and that includes the South China Sea where they they are attacking the Navy of a treaty Ally of the United States the Philippines and they're laying claim to the ocean you know hey nobody owns the ocean you know and and but they're laying claim to it uh and and then of course the coercion of Taiwan so in the speech uh xiin ping Likens uh you know the what he might have to do to Taiwan to Mal's actions in Korea which they call the war of American aggression right and he says in the speech that Mal delivered one blow to prevent a 100 blows so he portrays Chinese intervention attack in in in Korea as as preemptive because he was being surrounded you know and by uh and and so then he talks about Taiwan so it sounds very familiar to Putin's argument uh about the the invasion of Ukraine right this idea that they're beleaguered they're encircled they might need a preemptive action and so forth and and and he said we we we will have to sacrifice there are going to be sacrifices by the Chinese people to achieve the vision of the of national Jew Rejuvenation and the Chinese dream that sounds to me like and there and there are also physical preparations since the year 2000 Chinese military spending has has increased 45f fold th much of that has gone into three tiers of capabilities tier one would be the conventional capabilities that were necessary for a cross trade Invasion right think helicopters Landing ships and so forth uh how about a massive field Hospital they're building not field Hospital Military Hospital right AC cross the straight from Taiwan gee I wonder what that could be for right uh then uh then the second tier are things to keep us at Bay right tiered and layered air defense longwa strike capabilities electromagnetic Warfare counter satellite offensive cyber and the third is a massive increase in their strategic nuclear forces and and I believe they could possibly be trying to generate a first strike capability you remember the balloon right GE I wonder what the balloon was doing over the dtas you know and then drifting over norfol I wonder what the previous balloon was doing on the on the west coast near San Diego I mean they're looking at strategic sites to gather Communications intelligence that can't be gathered from from other means of collection and so I think all this is concerning you know so what does that mean for us I think what that means for us to take it seriously I believe we have to invest more in defense uh we should be spending I think about 4% of our GDP on defense capacity matters in terms of deterrence but how do you deter China you deter China with real capabilities helping Taiwan become indigestible but then forward positioning capable US forces forces that are capable of operating for ample duration and in sufficient scale to defeat the enemy so that's what I think we have to be focused on you know hard power matters right nobody's afraid of integrated deterrence right that sounds like pixie dust to me what they're afraid of is is real hard power sir I'm going to bring it back down you mentioned in the article taking risks as being part of the warrior profession and that risk adversion robs Warriors of their agency do you think the Army is too risk adverse well I don't know right I'm I'm you know I'm a washed up General chilling out at Stanford you know what I mean trying not to go too soft but the uh I you know I I I think um I I think you all of us can manage risk at your levels within your platoon within your company within your Battalion and and what what I would what I would emphasize to our uh soldiers and and leaders is that the riskiest course of action is is often times to not act to not act and uh for example you know in Iraq and Afghanistan uh there was a tendency at times not always but at times for you to consolidate on on big bases you know and and and to think that that's good for Force protection well meanwhile you what is the enemy doing the enemy is intimidating the civilian population so it can have freedom of movement through civilian populations gather and Marshall the resources to accomplish their objectives and then ultimately to attack you as you commute to the war right you can't commute to War what what seems risky would be to have small Patrol bases all through a city or in a rural area and to develop relationships with the population but that's actually much less risky when when uh when we were teeing up options for president Trump in in March of of uh April first week in April of 2017 after uh syrians had had committed mass murder of Innocents using the most heinous weapons on Earth nerve agents uh killed hundreds of people including including scores of children uh one of the pieces of advice that that I gave him was that previous administrations with the unenforced red line in Syria if you remember that 2013 2014 had been had been sort of captured by Frozen by immobilized by the the the the risk of action but what we we're seeing then I I I I suggested to him were the risks and costs of inaction and um and that we when we considered the risk of of of attacking the sh the K shakun Airfield and destroying the aircraft uh that conducted those attacks we should balance that against the risk of inaction and maybe that including the normalization of chemical weapons again you know on the 100y year anniversary of the Banning of chemical weapons after World War I that would be a really bad thing for the world all right sir So speaking of of a risk-taking withdrawals are often considered the most risky of all military operations along with with amphibious Landings which is again good for us with China and Taiwan there's some risk there for them but can you talk about the US's withdrawal from Afghanistan and August 2021 just from your perspective and impacts that you've seen okay this is another reason why I think the war EOS is at risk and I would first of all love to hear some of your thoughts on this and everything I I it's very painful for those of us who served in Afghanistan to see what happened in Afghanistan and I think that this has lent itself to more strain on the warrior ethos but also maybe a degree is a part of the problem with our recruiting efforts you know um I believe that militaries should be committed to win right I mean I I am sympathetic with with General MacArthur on this right that there's no substitute for victory and you know that's really the case for a very practical reason in war each side tries to outdo the other and if you don't go into a war trying to win you're seeding the advantage to your enemy who then is able to escalate and everything uh with impunity and keep you on the defensive and seize the initiative from you which is always what you don't want in war you want to be the one with the initiative have the enemy reacting to you I would like to bring the word win back into the Lexicon and I think that's what we lost sight of in in Afghanistan remember we kept hearing these kind of tropes right oh there's there's no military solution in Afghanistan well the Taliban came up with one didn't they you know and so you know I I I I think I think it's really important for us to maintain that commitment I'll tell you one quick anecdote if I can I was commander of the third armed Cavalry Regiment we went into an area that was an Al-Qaeda stronghold it was a training base for Al-Qaeda they wanted to hold on to it which gave us the opportunity to kill and capture large numbers of them which for which I was grateful but when when we went into this area we briefed our higher headquarters because we were new we're conducted reconnaissance as you would expect a caval unit would do to to gain visibility of the enemy to map the enemy to identify their sources of strength and support their physical sources of strength and support but also as we alluded to earlier their psychological and informational sources of support and to put together a strategy for defeating the enemy so I briefed my division and core commanders on our mission statement the third United States Cavalry conducts combined area security and counter Insurgency operations in our area and build Iraqi Security Forces to defeat the enemy in our area of operations and set conditions for sustainable security and stability so I had two senior officers like say what what is this word defeat like why are you defeating the enemy you know uh we didn't ask you to do that we asked you to transition which I'd like into like a flaming bag of feces strategy just hand the Iraqis a flaming bag of feces and get out the door I mean how the hell is that in our interest right so so explained okay hey um what we you know we have the enemies of all civilized people here this is Al-Qaeda they want to kill our children uh we have a we have a strategy we have an approach uh that I think will allow us to win the war um to win to defeat the enemy a operations and you know we did come all this way you know so like so like while we're here why don't we just knock it out so when I did get promoted breeder General it was not really that much of a mystery you know what I mean uh for a couple promotion boards but you know that was my my attitude we we had lost two soldiers that day we had lost lieutenant rubido and Sergeant Martinez two like fantastic all all of our soldiers so fantastic you know and so how do you not owe it to them to win right I think the ultimate test of a strategy the ultimate test of the plan you put together for your Tactical operation is if you can explain to your soldiers how the risk that they may take and the sacrifices they may make will contribute to an outcome worthy of those risks and worthy of those sacrifices and an outcome that's worthy of that does not sound like responsible end to me sir I'm going to I have one last question I'm going to turn over to the cadets so get some questions going so and the cadets in the audience they get this they they're aware they're aware of the challenges which they going to face them in in the in the very near future uh what would you say is the biggest challenge you see for them coming up next let's say you know in their time in the Army yeah I think the biggest challenge is that wherever you're going to be you're going to have to maybe fight outnumbered and underresourced which typically is not our thing you know what I mean it's not our thing and I think what one of the reasons you may be underresourced and outnumbered uh and you don't ever want this by the way hey you know there is kind of a streak of stoicism in parts of our army you know like especially our light infantry man I love light infantry you know what I mean but you know Automotive Revolution happened you know what I mean but but but the but the other thing is the other thing is there is this idea that you just want to get like in a scrap like small arms to Small Arms bandet no when in doubt bump up bump up right you know so you can have a 14-hour firefight back and forth back and forth back and forth or you can give a fire command you know Gunner heat machine gun and then destroy the machine gun and have a snack you know what I mean so or or you I mean you know what you want is smoke in Boots on the other end of the Tactical engagement right so so um that that we can do that because you know even if you win a fair fight it's still ugly on the end you don't want Fair fights but I think you're going to be in some Fair fights and the reason is and I hope maybe this changes that we have been lightening up in a lot of our combat enabling capabilities not as bad as Marine Corps got rid of their tanks and artillery I mean wow okay so um how does that make sense because what I believe I believe the close combat and close combat overmatch will be more important than future War even that it has been in the recent past now you might say well how is that true because we have drones and fpv drones we have artificial intelligence we have all these Nifty Things We can do in cyers space we've got you know but I'll tella cloudwood said that all mistakes are bad in war but the mistakes that come from kindness are the worst and by kindness he meant the belief that you think that that battle is going to be anything but bloody and desperate and depend on your toughness your courage your stamina your confidence in one another don't let don't think that that that's not going to be the case that's what it's going to depend on and the reason is again there are counter measures for everything right for drones there are going to be Direct Energy capabilities electromagnetic Warfare about 30 drones are lost by the ukra is like every month you know in Ukraine and so war is this continuous interaction of opposites and it's going to come down to close combat you know why because the outcome of War depends on the control of territory populations and resources and it always comes down to that you might say well we just need these Maritime capabilities or Aerospace cap yes you need them hell I would never want to go to war without the United States Air Force or navy Marine Corps anybody but when it comes down to it it comes down to the to the control of territory population resources where do all the problems originate that manifest themselves in the Aerospace and space and cyberspace Maritime domains they start on land unless we go to war against like the Dolphins it's on land and so you know I think that we can't kid ourselves close combat overmatch and by that I mean the physical capabilities the combined arms capabilities that can be brought to bear by all domains in support of your fight right but it has so much to do with Psych pschological uh and overmatch associated with the confidence you have in your ability to fight together as a team we have this idea that you can sprinkle units around and that will deter an enemy it's not going to DET deter an enemy you know I mean I look at at deployments of 100 200 300 soldiers I'm like what is how about you know how about 30,000 you know if we're really serious about it so I think because of this idea that we can send messages with military force instead of demonstrate the capability of fight and win is the way you deter I think that's going to get us potentially get you in a dangerous situation and just prepare for it prepare units to fight uh to fight maybe outnumbered and with certain disadvantages you're going to have certain advantages right you're United States we bring it all to Bear the Russians in in in uh in in in March the Vagner group in March of 2018 they said hey I wonder what happens if you fire on a US Special Forces and Ranger Outpost H you know what happens I you get smoked is what happens so so uh so nobody else can put it together like we can but we can't be complacent about that I'm going to turn with some questions from Cadets yeah please come to the microphone no I'm going to start with the uh I'm going to start with the first Captain go ahead first Captain sir Cadet vanderwal company B1 thanks for being here tonight I I really enjoyed your comments uh I wanted to go back to uh Rafa specifically thinking about Israel uh the basics of strategy that we learn at West Point is uh that strategy is the alignment of ends Ways and Means um thinking about Israel going into Rafa I see that more as of a course of action or a way but what is how can we think about an end state for Israel like how what are the possible options that they could consider in Gaza Thanks Martin okay hey so I don't think Israel is thinking enough about the end State and and how to organize it but they're not getting a lot of help either so it's difficult it's really hard because of the degree to which there's a strange between the Israelis and the Palestinians for them to be able to generate real Partnerships with Palestinians within Gaza and by the way guess who still has the guns Hamas even areas that have been cleared so if you step forward and say hey I'll be the mayor Gaza you know how what's your life expectancy you're going to be if you're not Hamas not very long so they have some real dilemmas associated with trying to get to that sustainable political outcome I was describing I think what they're thinking of in Terms now is clear Rafa and clear routes right High speed routes through Gaza that they can secure and they they can continue to raid against Hamas and keep Hamas down while they work with International entities to try to form somebody who's willing to be the mayor of Gaza but that person has to have guns right and those guns can't be like some weak unifil like the southern Lebanon uh operation it has to be a real peace enforcement Mission could the Egyptians do it as a backbone yes do they want to do it hell no they don't want to do it so I think that that's what it's going to take I think it's easy to criticize the Israelis ah they have no vision but really who's going to do it that's why when they said we're going to have to occupy it for a while I think they're going to have to occupy it for a while now that they don't want to occupy Gaza but I think what they're going to have to do it until some multinational force can come in Secretary blinkin I think has done the best job he can to try to Galvanize people to step up to do it but there's a great deal of reluctance to own the problem and uh and then Hamas still is a danger you know to to the Palestinians there you know as well as to anybody who would try to create an alternative political order thanks thanks sir Nate circc gerer company A2 you mentioned several authors and thinkers um you kind of quoted them can you give us just a short list of some of the most influential like writers that have shaped your thinking over the years okay all right so I mentioned Michael Howard already you know so you know I would read the essay the use and abuse of military history I'm sure we still teach that here and and any of his books are fantastic in terms of uh of of understanding war and and warfare um you know I think you know study study war in with depth and context read about personal experiences you know what Michael Howard writes about is when you read about you know small unit tactical battle battles and actions the Tidy outlines of History disappear right and you see the desperation of battle the human uh dimension of battle you know I think uh I think the face of battle is good for that because it's it's in in in width but it also is about battles that occurred over multiple centuries in the the same geographic location so you can see the you know you can see the uh the differences I think writers who take you from the Tactical to the Strategic and back are fantastic like uh David hacket fiser on Washington's Crossing or anything Rick ainson writes like the uh like the uh the the the uh the victory Trilogy World War II and and what he's writing on the revolution right now as well um then you want to read like surveys of of of wars and War experiences that again take you from the Tactical to the Strategic uh you know mcferson uh battlecry of Freedom fantastic book you know um and then and then you know because it's not too soon to think you have to think strategically right there's no like strategy switch on your back that gets turned on when you're a colonel you know and again it's because you have to be able to connect what you're doing at the Tactical level to what you're trying to achieve so I think books that look at war strategy o overall I'm thinking of Gard weinberg's book a world at Arms if World War II is in that in that genre uh but then also critiques of failures you know uh and and things that didn't work out you know and and uh anyway I could go on about it obviously I've got you know I've got to put a reading list back out there we had at the maneuver Center when I was there a we called it the maneuver leader self-study program and in it you could pick strategy you could pick tactical leadership you could pick combin arms operations and there was a there was a a u a reading list there and a program a program of self-study and a description of how you would go about about studying that topic Joe byley if anybody of you know know him uh he worked on this with me he's still on active duty I'll try to find that a resurrected or if the history Department can help me if that's still around somewhere um I think it's it was a useful guide we got a lot of hits on it but a lot from foreign armies more than the United States I mean the big the biggest number of hits we got was from the Indian army because the chief of staff of the Indian army said if you want to learn about War go to that self-study program and then we had like like where do we get all these hits on the website it was it was uh Indian army officers than thank you sir thanks go here sir KET Olson Company A1 thank you so much for coming out to talk to us can you talk about how can the US create trust with Russia through its actions in the modern battle space yeah okay all so so you talking about like how to counter Russian New Generation Warfare as well as what they're doing conventionally everything yes sir okay all right so hey you know this get goes to the theme of studying the past right so I was the director of the army capabilities integration Center how's that for a title and and ESS the job was to design the future Army and and so you know # predictable for an historian I'm like oh why don't we study the wars that's going on right now to see if there are any lessons from that so this the the study that we did in 2014 to 16 in 7 2014 to 16 was modeled on a study that General Don story who was a phenomenal officer you know a real Visionary and part of the Renaissance that happened in the Army from the postwar Vietnam period uh into the 80s and and into the 90s uh he did a study of the of the of the 1973 War uh in Israel and that was that study was a catalyst for a lot of the changes that occurred in Army Doctrine in leader development uh in in uh in in concept work and in modernization so I had the same kind of thing in mind hey let's put this team together we had physicists and historians and various types of military uh uh uh experts scientists of different kinds and they delivered a very a very solid uh study that uh that we learned a lot about and what we determined what we saw is that Russia had grafted a lot of new capabilities on some old capabilities and they had combined really some old capabilities like massive electronic warfare which they're still using to good effect in um in in Ukraine um and massive artillery combined with drones this was a forerunner of what we've seen the onslaught happening against Ukraine now and and what it was not that sophisticated you know like for us like we try to be precise they didn't really care back about being that precise you know I mean they would just they would throw they would throw a drone out they would terrain associate oh I think that's that that units in that area and they would take out the grid square with with rockets and artillery right and uh but at the same time they were engaged in a sophisticated campaign of political subversion including assassination but really cyber enabled disinformation information Warfare against us and so we we delivered this study uh and and uh and and I hope you know the Army internalized that uh as we as I was briefing the study on President's Day weekend in February 2017 uh I got a phone call to go interview for the job as National Security advisor at Mar Lago so I kind of left it you know abruptly but okay Russia what does Russia do overall you so you China does cooption coion and concealment right uh Russia does disruption first of all disrupt you right with political subversion uh with a massive attack right with the threat of an attack uh you know uh with uh with a coup in West Africa uh with the enabling of the Assad regime in Syria right disrupt and then and then and then uh and then to to really just deny I call it implausible deniability well that wasn't me that did whatever the hell it was right um and and then and then create dependencies as they try to do in Europe on on on gas and oil for for example and I think what we have to do is take all of that apart with Russia I think what's really important is to sustain support for the ukrainians in some critical areas teared and layer air defense everybody knows that but you have to be able to kill the Archer as well as shoot down the arrows so long range Precision fires we have to figure out how to cope with their electromagnetic Warfare capability and help provide especially terrestrial electromagnetic Warfare capability to counter drones they need more and better uh systems to provide to provide uh defense against the Glide bombs in particular that could be longer range air defense but there has to be an air defense shooting down that Arrow capability for that as well and then of of course that's a range of capabilities to for a military objective of stopping the onslaught against ukrainians then what you need are a range of capabilities to defeat their ground offensive and then and and and uh conduct a counter offensive and we know what that is right that's engineering capabilities uh Mobility capabilities in particular it is uh it is mobile protected Firepower they have a real Manpower issue on skilled infantry that is going to be critical excuse me and then they need you know they need Logistics I mean one of the things that I think is I wish we had done you know is not pull our advisors out first of all but if we could have formed like a civilian theater support command which is this amazing organization uh and help the ukrainians with Logistics and maintenance uh and and help us understand better the demands like what they needed I think that could have made a really a really big difference sir may please sir Cadet David Garcia wanted to thank you for joining us tonight my question sir uh so with Russ Russia and China both increasing their military spending dramatically in the last 20 years and our allies in Europe dramatically decreasing theirs how can we encourage our European allies to return to investing in the military and what role do they have in future conflicts yeah okay so burden sharing is a big issue you know and if president Trump's reelected I mean that's that was one of his really uh areas of emphasis hey I I think that they have to come to their own conclusions obviously they've all made the whale pledge to to spend at least 2% I think that France is on onraed to me meet that uh finally uh but the countries that are that are investing that amount in defense are those who are right right on the frontier with Russia the Baltic states uh you know sadly their GDP is not that big you know so it doesn't get you a whole bunch of military capability Poland certainly is far exceeding Poland you know will get well over three maybe three and a half um and and others like Romania you know they're they're meeting their 2% pledge um I think that the UK is going to is going to is going to invest more they just announced not enough probably uh but Germany has been the one who's that's been lagging and the reason why that's important is Germany has a huge GDP if Germany rebuilds its defense after really essentially unilaterally disarmed uh then then it could have a big impact on European security well the the chancellor Olaf Schultz talked about this ziton Venda you know this change and a realization that they're in a new era and they have to defend themselves but they've been slow really in being able to deliver that this is an important lesson for us though when you dismantle a capability it's really hard to build it back up it's much easier and cheaper to maintain a capability so I'm looking at what the Army did recently with Cavalry squadrons and infantry Brigade combat teams how hard is it going to be once you realize you have to do it to regenerate that reconnaissance and security capability within it's going to be hard as hell right uh once you get rid of it so you know I think that it's really important for us to to recognize that when we're making Force mon you know um management decisions and so forth with our own capabilities so I'm going to go here but this is the this is going to be the last question I apologize what I would recommend you all do is write an email to Major baroon and he'll answer it like he's General McMaster with your questions okay please good evening sir Cadet Jackson H3 um on the topic of trying to learn from mistakes of the past sir um the United States Army will continue to interact with civilian populations both during and after combat operations was the spiral that we witness in Afghanistan uh Direct result of a lack of continuity uh maybe in perhaps like Safety Management moving to a mounted only patrols yeah I think so I think it it it was a factor right the lack of continuity but also it was more than just a lack of continuity with Special Operations doing six-month tours that was mitigated to some extent that they would do multiple six-month tours and sometimes go back to the same place but often not but also units that gained a lot of experience in one area of operation in in in Iraq or Afghanistan they they went to the other country you know they went to a different area and so you couldn't rekindle those relationships often times it was like the Army staff at times was just trying to put patches on the map where they're supposed to go you know without enough thought to continuity beyond the tour length right which is I I think that's a good point too so there there things you could do to provide more continuity part of it also was areas in which our gains had not been fully Consolidated such that there were there were capable and legitimate Iraqi or Afghan security forces in place that were capable of operating without our support we often uncovered those areas completely based on just wanting to get out and this is one of the things that I think they learning the wrong lessons for example Conrad crane again our colleague who's fantastic historian you know and just fun person to be around he came up with that phrase you know two ways to fight asymmetrically and stupidly but he he also wrote a a great essay uh called um uh the Vietnam syndrome and and in it he makes the argument that we learned the wrong lesson of Vietnam like we're just never going to do that again right let's forget about that let's as in part an emotional cathartic leave Vietnam behind and focus on high-end war in Europe and that's where you get air battle General Don Star as I mentioned you goes to learn the lessons of the 73 War but you know who pretty soon we found ourselves in missions we you're intermingle with civilian populations not just in in in in Afghanistan in 2001 after the mass murder attacks of 9/11 but in Bosnia uh on a peace enforcement mission for example or in Somalia uh in a mission for humanitarian assists was turned into a fight so we are always going to be operating in and among the population understanding the social the political the historical the cultural Dynamics is always going to be important you know building relationships with people in those in in in in those uh societies and polities you know I'll tell you 90% of what you need to know about an operation somebody will tell you if you ask them right now often times times people who tell you things are trying to influence you you're going to get disinformation based on a various tribe or sect or the agenda associated with them but over time you can triangulate that you know so being a good listener bringing in cultural expertise hey when I'll just tell quickly when when I got to tilfer like our regiment did out of the blue we were in South Baghdad right we got moved up there I called the history Department you know and I said hey do you have anybody at the history Department who knows about ninwa Province yes Captain Dan Bernard who just finished his Doctorate in uh in in in in uh Iraqi history and wrote his dissertation on the 1920 revolt against the British in ninoa Province and so he sent us archival data and tribal maps and everything that were super relevant to our reconnaissance and when I say reconnaissance learning the area of operation broadly and then you know he came out he flew out and and and uh and helped our our regiment win that fight you know so so you know I'll tell you I I think that there's a tendency now I think to say okay we're never going to do that again in Afghanistan Iraq we're never going have to be musle population right I mean I mean of course you are of course you are so I think you know buck that Trend uh because what we don't want is our assumptions about future War to have us set up you know for disappointment who would have thought you know as as secretary Gates said our former secretary defense he said our track record for predicting the next War is perfect it's 0% right so so you just got to be prepared uh for a range of contingencies and and certainly for operating in and among populations yes sir thank you thank you so can we please give General McMaster a round of applause thanks thank thank so uh very quickly um I will tell you that one of the things that's really special about West point if you're a Cadet and you will see this soon is your connection to your faculty it's very very unique in higher education it's very different the the amount of time that your faculty spends with you the touch points you have with your faculty and then the relationships you keep with your faculty so Captain McMaster was was a professor here when I was a history major as a Cadet and I worked for him as a lieutenant and he has never ever failed when I've asked him for help in any situation whether that's a letter of recommendation whether that's just asking for for some wisdom or actually helping in in many many different ways including when he's been very very busy it is something I've always admired and I've modeled tried to model the best I can after him the same approach which is to try to give back and I think that is something that you should not dismiss about the the incredible uh the really the incredible aspect of West Point is that connection and sir it's always been wonderful to have you as a mentor and a friend and and a colleague and someone I can call when I need when I need help on anything so thank you again for being here he he has come and talked in many times in my life one time when I was a major at the Jag school and he'll show up whenever I ask and I he's a very busy man so I'm very very thankful sir Sarah on behalf of the academy thanks thank you thanks we have a couple of things for you you know if you look at his tie and his socks he's all in he's all in on West Point so s some Go Army Beat Navy cups course thanks thank you awesome and I have to I have to give it to he was in the archives earlier today this is the most recent publication from the West Point press the West Point landscape 1802 to 1860 by John malanowski and it is all come all came from the archives here at West Point so again sir thank you very much for being here thank you thank you are you guys it you're all dismissed thank you thank you everybody