How Ukraine’s INVASION Shows Russia Is WEAKER Than you Think!

For two years Vladimir Putin has threatened the  use of nuclear weapons, and now 1,000 square   kilometers of Russia are in the hands of Ukrainian  forces. In one brilliant military maneuver,   Ukraine has managed to expose Putin for the weak,  ineffectual leader that he is- and the question   the whole world is wondering is: what happened  to Putin's red lines? The invasion of Kursk is   the most stunning development in the Ukraine war  since the Ukrainian Armed Forces, or UAF, launched   its stunningly successful counteroffensive  in fall of 2022, exposing the weakness of the   Russian military to the world. Yet Ukraine has  been heavily criticized for redirecting badly   needed troops and equipment from the frontlines  to the east to carry out this invasion of Russia,   prompting many to ask if it's even worth it.  Misconceptions about Russia and war itself fuels   this speculation. If exposing Vladimir Putin's red  lines as a sham wasn't victory enough, observers   need to understand that war is not a binary choice  between battles to fight. The conflict in Ukraine   has pushed both nations to their limits, and the  lack of a coordinated and strong military response   by Russia to invasion of its territory proves what  many analysts have speculated for a long time now:   Russia's reserves are nearly completely out. When  one would have expected the rapid deployment of   reserves from the front in Ukraine to the  Kursk oblast, instead we've see evidence   of frontline units being thinned out along the  less intense parts of the front in east Ukraine,   as well as a mad dash to coordinate a slap-dash  response to the invasion with a mix of conscripts,   regular army forces, interior ministry forces,  private military companies, Chechen units,   national guard, and FSB border troops. It was  speculated that Russia would simply redirect large   numbers of troops from its Northern Grouping of  Forces that were in May threatening an invasion of   Kharkiv- yet this does not seem to have been the  case as of the writing of this script on August   17th. The Northern Grouping was planned to have a  force of 75,000 to score a definitive victory in   Kharkiv via a cross-border invasion from Russia,  yet intelligence estimates that at most Russia   only managed to put together between 20,000 to  50,000 troops, with the best intelligence pointing   at around 35,000. This force however suffered  significant attrition in the attempt to invade   Kharkiv, with President Biden approving the use of  American long-range weapons against Russian troop   formations inside of the Russian border. Russia,  which had believed itself invulnerable inside of   its own border due to Putin's constant nuclear  threats and western fears of escalation, was   caught completely by surprise, and the Northern  Grouping suffered significant casualties in a   blistering long-range strike campaign involving  volley after volley of artillery and HIMARS,   among other weapons. The lack of a sizable  response from the Northern Grouping to the Kursk   invasion strongly indicates that the forces massed  for a Kharkiv invasion are no longer capable   of large-scale maneuvers. Russia, and Vladimir  Putin's, military weakness is on full display to   the world- and the situation is dire. For months  there have been reports of Russian units stationed   along the border with NATO countries being thinned  out, with soldiers and equipment redeployed to   Ukraine. This runs in direct contrast with Putin's  constant narrative about NATO threatening Russia   militarily- yet more propaganda meant to justify  his invasion of Ukraine and rile up the domestic   population, while skewing public opinion among the  less informed in the west. Despite Finland joining   NATO, and Russia technically being the most  militarily vulnerable it has been in centuries,   Russian units along the shared border have been  consistently redeployed to Ukraine. Even in the   Kaliningrad enclave, itself a perilous Russian  toehold in Europe, Russian units, aircraft,   and missiles have been consistently retasked  for service in Ukraine. It is a significant   public relations failure for the west to not  have made this information more public as to   help fight Russian disinformation attempts, and  make it clear that not only did NATO never pose   a military threat to Russia, but that even  Russia never believed that it did. This is an   incredibly important narrative to drive home in  parts of the world where Russian disinformation   has been most effective: the global south. From  Africa to South America and even Southeast Asia,   Russian propaganda narratives remain louder and  more convincing than the truth, distorting global   opinion on the war in Ukraine and NATO both.  The Kursk invasion has significantly complicated   the war in Ukraine for Russia and compounded its  many weaknesses- while exposing more of Putin's.   Putin took three days to respond publicly to the  invasion, and did not bother to appoint a head of   a military response to the invasion for over a  week. This was a stunning error on his behalf,   as it's allowed Ukrainian forces to run roughshod  over Kursk's unorganized defenders. Putin's   weakness though is almost certainly a reflection  of Russia's weakness- the initial response to the   invasion seems to have been an uncoordinated mess  between regular army forces largely made up of   conscripts, FSB border guards, and irregular  forces such as PMCs and Chechen units. Per   Ukrainian battlefield sources, the Russians lacked  any coordination between the disparate groups,   making them easy prey for the UAF's professional  combined arms maneuver into Kursk. A common   folly of dictatorships is a lack of honesty  and accountability among the lower ranks,   which directly impedes the flow of information  to the head of state. It's likely that nobody   was telling Putin the truth about the invasion  because nobody wanted to be blamed for it, or   speak contrary to the government narrative that it  was a minor event and the UAF were already being   contained. A lack of clear joint command structure  inside of the Russian government also impeded a   coordinated response, and this could be either  due to incompetence or by design. In the United   States, authorities flow along clearly defined  chains of command, unifying the disparate elements   of the US Armed Forces and government support  agencies. However, for a dictator like Putin,   unified and clearly defined chains of command  are a threat to his grip on power- he has learned   well how many who came before him were undone by  underlings holding the reins to various arms of   the Russian government at once. Thus power is kept  divided, and chains of command kept independent.   The end result is that when crisis strikes  information does not flow freely and a response   is unclear. Ukraine took full advantage of this to  outmaneuver Russian forces. It's not just in Kursk   though that we see evidence of Russia's difficulty  in coordinating forces, as even inside of Ukraine   amongst the branches and even different parts  of each branch, Russia struggles to coordinate   military maneuvers on a larger scale. The lack  of reserves also highlights Putin's weakness   even as the Ukraine war shows no sign of slowing.  Both nations are experiencing the same problem   in this regard, with both militaries being fully  committed. However, despite Russia's vastly larger   industry and manpower pool, Ukraine is better  positioned to be in a winning position- even if   it cannot fully throw Russia out of its territory  at the conclusion of hostilities. Ukraine has long   delayed a wider mobilization due to its population  crisis- the nation simply does not have enough   young men to maintain the health of its economic  future. Hence the average age of a Ukrainian   soldier is around 40 years old, but the reality of  war pressures in the east has forced Kyiv's hand,   and a major mobilization drive began this summer,  targeting younger conscripts. There has been some   pushback from Ukrainian society as war weariness  settles in, but there have been no major displays   against mobilization, and most draftees report  for duty as instructed even if they first seek   out an exemption at draft offices. Government and  military insiders predict that Ukraine will be   able to hit a target of 200,000 fresh recruits  by year's end, with the largest concern being   training and equipping them. Here though Ukraine's  allies have already been stepping in- the United   States has so far given over 100,000 sets of body  armor, with another 25,000 sets transferred early   this year. NATO instructors are also helping  train Ukrainian troops in training areas around   Europe and the US. A new NATO program launched  in July of this year includes a force of 700 NATO   instructors to train Ukrainian troops on NATO  equipment and basic combat skills. The training   of Ukrainian fighter pilots to fly the F-16 has  been accelerated, with the first combat coded jets   already flying in the skies of Ukraine, if not  taking in part of missions yet as of mid-August.   Despite challenges, Ukrainian morale remains high-  even amongst frontline troops. But these troops   are exhausted, with most not having been rotated  out of the front in the entire two and a half   years of fighting. The callup of freshly mobilized  personnel will help relieve this incredible   pressure, and victories in Kursk have raised  morale significantly both among troops and the   civilian population. By comparison, the Russian  situation is far worse. Mobilization in Russia is   a very sensitive subject, given the nation's  disastrously high cost wars in Afghanistan   and Chechnya when measured in human lives. The  well-known abuse of conscripts also helps sour the   Russian population to the idea of mobilization,  and when Russia launched its first mobilization   at the close of year one of the war, Russian  society reacted extremely poorly despite tight   media and thought controls in the nation. Putin  has worked very carefully to bolster his forces   without drawing public ire. While conscripts  have wound up in combat roles in Ukraine, Putin   has went to great lengths to avoid it happening  after an initial outcry from Russian mothers when   it was discovered conscripts had taken part in the  original disastrous invasion. He even went so far   as to meet with a group of them and personally  apologize, promising to ensure it did not happen   again. Despite blatant- and often extreme- abuse  of conscripts, the social contract between the   Russian government and its people are that its  conscripted teenagers and young adults are not   to be sent to active combat, and instead fulfill  support roles inside of Russia itself. Thus Putin   has focused his efforts on volunteers- or in many  cases, 'voluntolds'. There are numerous disturbing   cases, including some with video evidence,  of conscripts forced into signing enlistment   papers at the end of their conscription period.  Coerced with threats or even outright violence,   conscripts have routinely wound up on the  frontlines- with one key difference: they   were now volunteer soldiers. Russian society can  tolerate a truly apocalyptic level of casualties,   as long as they are seen as volunteers who  fought- and died- by their own choice. If   a conscript complains that they were forced to  sign enlistment papers, the answer is typically   something along the lines of “nobody can force  you to do anything”. These forced enlistees though   often are quick to surrender or retreat, prompting  the use of blocking forces to shoot any who refuse   to take part in direct assaults. There are still  a significant number of volunteers in Russia's   army though, even despite the staggering casualty  rate. Extremely generous pay packages, financed   by Russia's massive pre-war sovereign wealth  fund, have been very appealing to many Russians-   specially those living in remote regions. For  these rural Russians, a single month's pay under   current contracts can be as much as a full year's  salary back home. Cleverly though, Russia does not   pay out a full contract up front, and sends these  high earners straight to the most dangerous parts   of the fighting. Thus it's rare for any of these  volunteers to ever receive the full value of their   contract before dying or becoming seriously  injured. Recruitment efforts also show Putin's   weakness. To date, the bulk of Russian recruitment  efforts have been towards rural populations and   Russian minorities, as well as third country  nationals inside of Russia and around the world,   lured into service with the promise of Russian  citizenship upon completion of their service. As   in many places, these minorities are seen as  'less dead' when casualty figures are tallied,   because to Russian society they matter less than  casualties of ethnic Russians or those from rich,   cosmopolitan cities like St. Petersburg and  Moscow. This pool of manpower however is drying   up, and as Russian casualties mount at incredible  rates estimated to be between 1,000 and 1,500 a   day, another mobilization becomes increasingly  necessary if Russia is to avoid a total defeat   in Ukraine. This scares Putin deeply though  given how unpopular the first mobilization was,   specially because this next mobilization will  by necessity include a significant amount   of the types of Russians that Russians care  about: those living in the rich cities. The   fact that no major mobilization was announced  after the invasion of Kursk and the continued   delay in assembling a response force indicates how  terrified Putin is of being forced to announce a   second wave of mobilization- and how increasingly  weak his grip on Russian power is becoming. Yet   said mobilization is seen as inevitable, and  as deliveries of western weapons ramp up and   restrictions on their use loosen, casualties  of young Russians will mount, threatening to   destabilize Russian society. Politically, the  invasion of Kursk is the most catastrophic blow   to Putin's legitimacy in the entire 25 year run  of his hold on Russian power. The Russian military   has always suffered from significant weaknesses,  but a brilliant propaganda campaign had convinced   the world otherwise for decades. Putin has  historically leveraged this illusion of Russian   might- despite disastrous campaigns in Chechnya  and Georgia- to deter his political enemies and   coerce nations once belonging to the Soviet bloc.  In the west, Putin has managed to wage a brilliant   propaganda campaign resulting in the world's most  powerful military alliance to self-deter from   providing aid to Ukraine out of fear of Russian  retaliation- a real lion being afraid of the mouse   scenario. Every aid package to date has resulted  in endless deliberation and careful estimation   of what a Russian response might be, carefully  calculated to ensure that aid wouldn't be too   'provocative' to the Russian Federation and risk  escalating this conflict. Never mind that Putin's   army can't win victory against his much smaller  neighbor, and NATO is the most powerful assembly   of military forces to ever exist on earth. Yet the  invasion of Kursk has shattered Putin's bluffs,   and might have in fact been one of the strategic  objectives of Ukraine's armed forces. There is   ongoing speculation as to whether the west was  aware of this invasion or not as it was being   planned, and we personally believe- based off  the rapid delivery of what seemed like a prepared   statement from the white house, as well as a  complete lack of the typical hand-wringing- that   the west was in fact aware. Or at least key allies  were. There's little other explanation for why   western equipment was amongst the first to roll  into Russia, performing the role inside of Russian   territory it had originally been designed to do.  Germany, which still refuses to authorize the use   of its Taurus missiles against targets it deems  too 'provocative'- has had none of the expected   outcry after its Marder combat vehicles were seen  inside of Kursk. Given how traditionally Germany   has required written permission from Vladimir  Putin for each German bullet fired by a Ukrainian   soldier, the lack of outcry strongly insinuates  that the west was well aware of the Kursk invasion   before it happened. This likely means one very  specific thing, and it is likely true even if   the west was unaware of the planned invasion: this  invasion has wider political goals outside of the   war itself. To put it very simply, Ukraine cannot  win this war under the terms currently imposed on   it by NATO on the use of western supplied arms.  The early summer Russian offensive in Kharkiv   showed just how close to disaster Ukrainian  forces had come, and it was entirely the fault   of its western allies. Restrictions on the use  of western weapons inside of Russia allowed the   nation to gather its invasion forces completely  free of consequence, and historically Russia has   used the invulnerability provided by its invisible  border to mass forces, launch air attacks, and   stage equipment, completely safe from Ukrainian  attack due to fears in the west over 'escalation'.   Thankfully, President Biden saw the danger in  allowing Kharkiv to fall once again and swiftly   authorized the use of American weapons inside  of Russian territories- under strict conditions.   The would-be offensive, which was predicted  to completely overwhelm Ukraine's defenses,   was crushed by Ukrainian long range strikes  destroying its troop concentrations and equipment   staging areas. Further attacks against Russian  air fields have forced its aviation to move   further from the border, and even destroyed some  aircraft and a lot of munitions and fuel on the   ground. The end result is Russian air strikes have  slowed considerably. By invading Kursk, Ukraine   has shown that Putin's red lines do not exist,  and emboldened its allies to act more freely.   Spurred by the success in Kursk, escalation-shy  Germany has seen a resurgence in support for   sending even more Leopard tanks to Ukraine,  and President Biden is in the final stages   of authorizing the sending of cruise missiles. In  just one week of fighting inside of Russia itself,   the two year long self-deterrence the west has  imposed on itself has completely collapsed, and   now it's simply a question of politicians catching  up to the new reality on the ground. A reality   where Vladimir Putin is weak, and his threats  empty. Now go check out Why Ukraine's INVASION   of Russia Changed Everything or  click this other video instead!